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Trade imbalances are a key feature of the latest wave of globalization. Although the Great Recession
and the subsequent collapse of international trade led to a significant correction, trade imbalances
are still large and on the rise. For instance, as Figure 1 shows, Germany’s total trade surplus in
goods and services reached 6.7 percent of GDP in 2014, thereby exceeding the pre-crisis peak. In
the same year, China’s trade surplus and the U.S. trade deficit equaled, respectively, 3.7 and 3
percent of their GDP. Moreover, in current U.S. dollars, China’s and Germany’s trade surpluses
were, respectively, 40 and 15 percent larger in 2014 than in 2007.
Trade imbalances are not only large, they are also persistent. For instance, the United States
have been running trade deficits for 40 years in a row, and Germany and China trade surpluses
for more than 20 consecutive years. This is a general and often overlooked feature of trading
economies. For instance, in a sample of 70 countries with available data between 1960 and 2014, we
have computed the maximum number of consecutive years in which each country experienced an
imbalance of the same sign. Strikingly, the median value of this measure of persistence is 27 years
(and the mean is nearly 30 years). Moreover, for 6 countries in our sample, imbalances persisted
with the same sign over the entire period of analysis (55 years).
Despite their prevalence, the welfare implications of these imbalances are not fully understood,
because trade models typically focus on the assumption of balanced trade, while models of interna-
tional finance often focus on inter-temporal rather intra-temporal trade. This prevents the theory
from shedding light on some recurrently debated issues. For instance, China’s integration into the
world economy was accompanied by large and growing trade surpluses. Did this type of trade
opening harm or benefit China and its main trade partners? Similarly, it is widely believed that
the creation of the eurozone, and the induced rigidities in the nominal exchange rates, led Germany
to accumulate huge trade surpluses. Did this help or undermine the process of European economic
integration? More in general, what are the real effects of the international transfers that are so
frequent in financially integrated areas such as the eurozone?
Trade theory does provide the tools for answering these questions. However, the dominant
approach in the literature on trade imbalances builds on the assumptions of perfectly competitive
markets and constant returns to scale. This approach, whose intellectual history dates back to
the debate between Ohlin and Keynes on the effects of international transfers, was formalized by
Samuelson (1954) and Dornbusch, Fisher and Samuelson (1977), and recently revived by Dekle,
Eaton and Kortum (2007, 2008). Its main lesson is that a trade surplus is unambiguously welfare














Figure 1: Trade Surplus in Goods and Services. Source: World Development Indicators.
a terms-of-trade deterioration. This conclusion is however at odds with the common wisdom sur-
rounding policy debates. For instance, if trade imbalances always benefit deficit countries at the
expense of surplus countries, how is it that the U.S. administration often complains that China’s
large bilateral trade surpluses are harming the U.S. economy? And how is it that China accumu-
lated such large surpluses and tried to postpone as much as possible the rebalancing of its foreign
trade? Similarly, how is it that trade imbalances within the eurozone are associated with the eco-
nomic hegemony of surplus countries (by most macroeconomic indicators) and the stagnation or
even the collapse of deficit countries?
In this paper, we challenge the conclusions from the traditional approach and show that the
so-called “new trade theory” can provide radically different and so far overlooked answers to old
questions. To this purpose, we explore the welfare effects of trade imbalances in the Dixit-Stiglitz-
Krugman model of monopolistic competition. Differently from recent attempts at measuring well-
known effects of rebalancing (such as the double burden of a trade surplus) using trade models
suitable for quantitative analysis, our aim is to highlight some unconventional possibilities. To bring
these out with the greatest clarity, the model is stylized. Yet, it builds on standard assumptions
and it is useful for illustrating some possibilities that seem to have been largely neglected in earlier
discussions. In addition, following the literature on international transfers, we study the effects of
an exogenous imbalance without taking a stand on its causes.
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We therefore formulate a two-sector, multi-country, general-equilibrium version of the model in
Krugman (1980) that is standard in most respects: one sector produces a homogeneous good under
perfect competition and constant returns to scale, and the other produces differentiated goods
under monopolistic competition and costly trade. The main novelties are that the homogeneous
good is nontraded and that trade imbalances arise whenever the exchange rate (i.e., the relative
wage) is inconsistent with balanced trade. These are realistic features: the differentiated sector
stands for manufacturing production, which is far more traded than services, and trade is not
balanced in general. In contrast, many existing models of monopolistic competition (e.g., Helpman
and Krugman, 1985, Melitz and Redding, 2014) assume that the homogeneous good is freely traded
and that trade is balanced.
As in the traditional theory, in our model a trade surplus involves an income transfer to the
deficit country and possibly a terms-of-trade deterioration. Unlike the standard theory, however,
trade imbalances do not impose any double burden on surplus countries. This is because the model
features a production-delocation effect, in that a trade surplus requires a reallocation of labor
towards tradables. In turn, as first shown in Venables (1987), in the presence of trade costs the
resulting increase in the number of local manufacturing firms leads to a reduction in the local price
index. A striking implication is that a trade surplus always leads to a reduction in the real price
of traded goods which is ceteris paribus beneficial. Thus, a surplus involves an income transfer on
the one hand, and a beneficial expansion in the traded sector on the other. The net welfare effect
is, in general, ambiguous, and we show that it can be positive when the elasticity of substitution
between traded goods is low and trade costs are high. We show, however, that in our baseline setup
the net welfare effect is negative for reasonable parameter values.
Next, we consider a richer setup in which we allow for manufacturing intermediates in the
production of final goods. We find that intermediate goods, which account for more than two thirds
of international trade, can dramatically change our quantitative and qualitative conclusions. In
particular, we find that a trade surplus may lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate, to a terms-
of-trade improvement and even to a welfare increase under reasonable parameter configurations.
We then simulate the model’s behavior under two different scenarios replicating the imbalances of
China and Germany, the two largest surplus countries in the world. In both cases, the beneficial
price-index effect reduces significantly the direct cost of the transfer. This finding is confirmed when
we extend our analysis to allow for more general assumptions about preferences and technology,
for endogenous labor supply and for variable markups.
Finally, we perform a different but related thought experiment: rather than studying the price
effect of an exogenous increase in the transfer, as in most of the literature, we study instead what
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happens if a government fixes the international relative wage, i.e., the exchange rate. For example,
the Chinese government might have been intervening in the international capital markets so as to
avoid any deterioration of the country’s competitiveness. Since in our model the general-equilibrium
relationship between the exchange rate and the transfer is dictated by a trade-imbalance condition,
one might suspect that fixing the exchange rate or the transfer is immaterial for the results. We
find that, surprisingly, this is not the case in the presence of intermediate goods. The reason is
that intermediate goods give rise to agglomeration economies through the cost and demand linkages
between producers of intermediate and final goods, as in Krugman and Venables (1995). With fixed
relative wages, agglomeration economies imply that, depending on the parameter configurations,
the manufacturing sector may tend to concentrate in one country.
These results have far-reaching implications. They may help explain why a country like China,
who resists the real appreciation of its currency through the accumulation of foreign reserves and
capital controls, can become a ‘world factory’.1 They also revisit some insights from the ‘new
economic geography’literature (e.g., Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999). In particular, we find
that a crucial condition for agglomeration is the lack of adjustment of relative wages.2 So long as
relative wages are endogenous, the symmetric equilibrium is always stable under balanced trade
and agglomeration is impossible. Under a fixed relative wage, instead, the model properties are the
same as in Krugman and Venables (1995): the symmetric balanced-trade equilibrium may become
unstable, in which case manufacturing firms start to agglomerate in the surplus country.
Besides the literature on the effects of rebalancing already mentioned (especially Dekle, Eaton
and Kortum, 2007 and 2008, and Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2007), our paper is related to the classical
debate on how international transfers affect the terms of trade and welfare for the donor and
recipient countries. The large research effort that followed the controversy between Ohlin and
Keynes has shown that, in theory, the terms-of-trade and welfare effects of a transfer can go either
way (e.g., Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta, 1983). Although a transfer could conceivably improve
the donor’s terms of trade so much as to increase its welfare, the conditions for this outcome
are considered more stringent than those for immiserizing growth, and this possibility is therefore
deemed a theoretical curiosity. In practice, the widespread presumption is that nontraded goods
and costly trade generate a home bias in consumption, which implies that a transfer causes a
deterioration of the donors’terms of trade and hence a double burden. Our results challenge this
conventional view. It is precisely in the presence of trade costs that the entry margin can turn the
1 In Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011) a constant wage also plays a key role in explaining the Chinese growth
miracle. However, in their model it is the result of labor reallocations, and not of government intervention.
2Helpman (1998) shows that nontraded goods can weaken agglomeration forces in a very different two-region
model with labor mobility.
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adverse terms-of-trade effect of the transfer into a favorable change of the price level in the donor
country. Moreover, with traded intermediate inputs, production costs can fall so much in the donor
country that a rise in wages (hence an improvement in the terms of trade) is needed to restore the
equilibrium.
The closest paper to ours is Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2013), who develop a two-country
model of monopolistic competition to study how the entry margin affects the price effects of a
transfer. Similarly to us, they find that the implications for prices can be very different when the
adjustment occurs at the extensive margin. Differently from us, however, they do not find that
entry can lower the real cost of the transfer for the sending country. The main reason for this
difference is that they treat varieties and entry symmetrically in the traded and nontraded sector.
However, existing evidence (see next section) suggests that scale economies are more prevalent in
manufacturing sectors. For this reason, we prefer to model an asymmetry across sector, shutting
down the variety effect entirely in the nontraded sector, which is assumed to produce a homogeneous
good. A key advantage of our specification is that of making our unconventional results most
transparent. Different from Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2013), in addition, we also consider
intermediate goods, which play an important role in our analysis.
This paper also contributes to the growing literature trying to bridge trade theory and inter-
national finance. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) were among the first to recognize that introducing
explicitly trade costs helps explaining various puzzles in international macroeconomics. Ghironi
and Melitz (2005) show that adding endogenous varieties contributes at explaining international
business cycles. Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2007) study the effect of various shocks when entry
and trade costs give rise to a “home-market effect”but without intermediate goods.3 Our model
shows that these ingredients can change significantly the welfare implications of trade imbalances.
Since the production-delocation effect implies that a devaluation has a beneficial effect on the price
index, it is plausible to conjecture that this mechanism can help explaining why, as widely believed
in policy circles, devaluations can be welfare improving.4
Finally, in this paper we model imbalances as exogenous transfers in a static setup with no
uncertainty. We do this to preserve comparability to the literature on international transfers and
show how the results are affected by firms’location decisions. In more general models, the welfare
implications may also depend on whether imbalances arise from intertemporal decisions and on
3 In the trade literature, Ossa (2011) shows that the “home-market effect” can help rationalize trade policy. See
also Bagwell and Staiger (2015) and Campolmi, Fadinger and Forlati (2013).
4The interaction between monetary policy, industry relocations and comparative advantage is studied explicitly
in an interesting recent paper by Bergin and Corsetti (2015), who show in a model with monopolistic competition
and sunk entry costs that stabilizing policies can foster competitiveness.
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the extent of international financial integration.5 Interestingly, Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2007)
find that the home-market effect can have different implications with enough risk sharing. In
particular, they find, inter alia, that a productivity shock leads to smaller price adjustments and
larger quantity adjustments under full insurance.6 This echoes our case with a fixed exchange
rate. However, in reality international risk sharing is imperfect and probably more relevant when
studying productivity shocks than an exogenous international transfer. In any case, we view the
mechanism illustrated in this paper as an important component for a more complete understanding
of the macroeconomic effects of trade imbalances.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. To better motivate our theoretical analysis, we
begin in Section 2 by discussing the empirical foundations of our main assumptions. In Section 3
we formulate our baseline model with monopolistic competition and trade costs. In Section 4 we
extend the model by adding intermediate goods, endogenous labour supply and variable markups.
In Section 5 we study the effects of fixing the relative wage rather than the trade imbalance. Section
6 concludes.
2 Motivating Evidence: Trade Imbalances and Production Structure
Our theory builds on the assumption that trade imbalances are non-neutral on a country’s produc-
tion structure, and that the latter matters because of important technological asymmetries across
sectors. We now discuss the evidence in support of these key assumptions.
To begin with, Figure 2 plots the industry share of GDP on the vertical axis, which proxies for
the importance of tradable goods in total value added, and the trade surplus in goods and services
as a share of GDP on the horizontal axis.8 We measure both variables at current prices and report
their five-year average between 2005 and 2009. As the figure shows, trade surpluses are strongly
positively correlated with the industry share of GDP, and trade imbalances account for 30 percent
of the cross-country variation in industrial production.9
Next we perform a more systematic analysis, so as to also exploit the time variation in our
variables of interest. To this purpose, we use a panel of up to 188 countries observed between
5See Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2013) for a case in which the transfer is endogenous.
6See also Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2008) and the recent synthesis in Corsetti, Dedola and Viani (2012) on the
role of international financial markets in explaining the effects of productivity shocks on the real exchange rate and
the terms of trade.
7Trade imbalances may also have additional effects. See for instance Crino’and Epifani (2014) for an analysis of
their distributional implications.
8 In our data, Industry corresponds to ISIS divisions 10-45 and includes all manufacturing activities.
9The statistics reported in the figure are computed using all the available data, but for expositional purposes we
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Figure 2: Trade Imbalances and Industrial Production. Source: WDI.
1960 and 2014, sourced from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). A first set of
results is reported in Table 1, where the dependent variable is the industry share of GDP and the
key explanatory variable is the trade surplus in goods and services as a share of GDP. In column
(1), we show the results of a baseline fixed-effects regression without controls, using annual data;
in column (2), we add time dummies and the openness ratio; moreover, following Rodrik (2016),
we also control for (the log of) population and per capita income, and their squared terms. In
column (3), we add country-specific linear trends to further control for the fact that countries with
different income levels may experience different patterns of structural change. In column (4), we
trim our sample by excluding observations in the first and 99th percentiles of the distribution of
trade imbalances. Across all specifications, the coeffi cient on the trade surplus is always positive
and very precisely estimated.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
In columns (5)-(8), we study the sensitivity of our results with respect to the proxy for trade
imbalances. In particular, we rerun our most conservative regression specification in column (3) by
using alternative measures of imbalances. In column (5) we consider only trade in goods (i.e., we
exclude net trade in services); in column (6) we exclude trade in fuels; in columns (7) and (8) we use
instead broader measures of imbalances, respectively, the current account and international reserves.
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Interestingly, the coeffi cient on these proxies is always very precisely estimated and generally similar
in size, suggesting that all these measures of imbalances are associated with a significant change in
the production structure.
In columns (9) and (10), we rerun the same regression specifications as in columns (2) and
(3) by taking five-year averages of our variables instead of using annual data. This may help to
reduce the impact of outliers and measurement error and is informative about the persistence of
our correlations beyond the very short run. Interestingly, the results are essentially identical.
As a further robustness check, in Table 2 we rerun the same regression specifications as in Table
1 by measuring our variables in first differences rather than in levels. Specifically, in columns (1)-(8)
we take the first differences of annual data, and in columns (9)-(10) the first differences of five-year
averages. Note that changes in the trade surplus are strongly positively associated with changes in
the production structure, and that the coeffi cient of interest is always very precisely estimated.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
To sum up, our results show a strong correlation between trade imbalances and industrial
production, across countries and overtime, using different measures of imbalances and controlling
for a number of covariates. These results are also consistent with, and complementary to, some key
findings in Rodrik (2008). Specifically, Rodrik shows that a measure of currency undervaluation is
strongly positively correlated with the industry share of GDP and with economic growth.
Having argued that trade imbalances are non-neutral on a country’s production structure, we
now briefly mention some evidence suggesting that a country’s production structure matters because
of the existence of significant asymmetries between sectors. First, scale economies are believed to
be more prevalent in manufacturing sectors. For instance, Buera and Kaboski (2012) show that
average firm scale is much larger in manufacturing than in services, suggesting that fixed costs
are larger in the former. Innovation is also heavily concentrated in manufacturing. In particular,
the U.S. manufacturing sector accounts for more than two-thirds of R&D spending and more than
three-quarters of U.S. corporate patents despite accounting for less than one-tenth of U.S. private
non-farm employment (Autor et al., 2016).
Second, backward linkages are also stronger in manufacturing. For instance, using input-output
tables, Yamano and Ahmad (2006) find that the ratio of manufacturing intermediates to value
added plus intermediates is around 0.5 in the manufacturing sector, a value that is ten times higher
than the corresponding figure in services. Due to substantial linkages with many other sectors,
manufacturing output also stimulates economic activity more than any other sector. For instance,
calculations from the BEA input-output tables show that manufacturing output induces three
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times as much demand in other sectors than retail and wholesale trade. Agglomeration spillovers
are also found to be large in manufacturing. For instance, Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti
(2010) estimate that the opening of a large manufacturing plant has a significant positive impact
on total factor productivity of incumbent plants in the same county.
Finally, trade costs are also asymmetric across sectors. It is well known that traded goods mainly
consist of industrial products. More in general, trade costs are lower in more R&D-intensive sectors
in which intra-industry trade is more prevalent and where the home-market effect is expected to
be quantitatively more important (e.g., Davis, 1998).
We now develop a model that builds on these observations, namely, that trade imbalances are
associated with a relocation of manufacturing firms which have important spillover effects on the
rest of the economy.
3 The Price-Index Effect of Trade Imbalances
3.1 Baseline Setup
Overview. Consider a world consisting of N + 1 countries: Home, indexed by i = h, and N For-
eign, each indexed by i = f . While Home is allowed to differ from Foreign, for simplicity all the N
Foreign are identical to each other. There is one homogenous production factor, labor, with endow-
ments Lh and Lf . All countries produce a homogeneous nontraded good, S, and a differentiated
traded good M (henceforth, manufacturing goods). The nontraded good is produced under perfect
competition, using one effi ciency unit of labor to produce one unit of output. Following Corsetti,
Martin and Pesenti (2013), we choose the wage per effi ciency unit of labor as the numeraire in each
country and denote by ε the exchange rate, defined as the price of Foreign’s numeraire in terms
of Home’s. According to this convention, a rise of ε represents an exchange rate depreciation in
Home. Due to symmetry, the exchange rate between any pair of Foreign is one. The traded sector
is monopolistically competitive à la Dixit-Stiglitz: a large mass of symmetric firms produce differ-
entiated goods using a fixed cost f and a variable cost 1/θ in effi ciency units of labor. There are
iceberg trade costs: τ > 1 units must be shipped in order for one unit to arrive at the destination.
Preferences. Preferences are represented by the following quasi-linear utility function:










Ci(S) is consumption of a nontraded good; Ci(M) is consumption of a CES aggregate of differ-
entiated traded goods, indexed by z ∈ n, where n is the total mass of manufacturing firms in all
countries; σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two traded goods.10 The ideal price









where p̃i(z) is the local-currency final price of variety z, gross of any trade cost.
Trade imbalances are modeled as a transfer Ti from the surplus country (Home, i.e., Th > 0) to
the N deficit countries (Foreign, i.e., Tf < 0) equal to the value of the trade surplus. Consequently,
expenditure per capita equals Yi − Ti/Li, where Yi is the labor effi ciency of one worker.
Maximization of (1) implies that Ci(M)Pi = 1. Consumption of the nontraded good therefore
equals:11
Ci(S) = Yi − 1− Ti/Li.
Substituting Ci(S) and Ci(M) = 1/Pi into (1) yields the indirect utility function:12
Vi = Yi − 1− Ti/Li − lnPi. (3)
Evidently, welfare is decreasing in the transfer and in the price index of manufacturing goods, as
both lead to a reduction in consumption. Recall that in standard models with perfect competition
a trade surplus involves a transfer Ti and a higher price index Pi (due to the induced terms-of-trade
deterioration) and is therefore unambiguously welfare reducing. As shown below, matters are more
interesting in monopolistic competition.
Price Indexes. Goods-market equilibrium in Home requires the equality between supply and
demand for each traded good:
qh = dh + τNxh, (4)
10The above preferences imply that total expenditure on manufacturing goods is exogenous. The latter will be
endogenized in the next section, in which we assume that manufacturing goods are used both as final goods and as
intermediates in the production of other manufacturing goods. In a robustness check we also study how the results
are affected when preferences are Cobb Douglas rather than quasi linear.
11Note that an interior equilibrium in which the nontraded good is produced in all countries requires Ci(S) > 0⇔
Yi − 1 > Ti/Li, a condition always satisfied for Yi suffi ciently high.
12For later use, note that total nominal income equals YiLi and that the share allocated to manufacturing is 1/Yi.
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where qh is the output; dh and xh are, respectively, the domestic and export demand for a good
produced in Home.13 Similarly, for each Foreign-produced good:
qf = df + τxfh + (N − 1)τxff , (5)
where df is local demand, xfh is demand from Home and xff is demand from the other (N − 1)







σ , xfh =
P σ−1h Eh
(τpf ε)




where pi is the local-currency price of a locally produced good, and Ei = Li is the total expenditure
on manufacturing goods in country i. As usual, demand for a given good is increasing in the price
index Pi and decreasing in its own price, with an elasticity equal to σ. Hence, a depreciation (a
rise of ε) increases Home firms’exports at the expense of Foreign’s.
Profit maximization and symmetry in θ imply ph = pf = p = σ/[(σ − 1)θ]. The Home terms of
trade, defined as the common-currency price of imports in terms of exports, are therefore equal to
ε in this baseline model. Free entry and symmetry in f imply instead a break-even level of output
equal to qh = qf = q = f(σ− 1)θ. Without loss of generality, from now on we normalize p = 1 and
q = 1. Thus, using (6) in (4) and (5) yields:
1 = P σ−1h Eh + φε
σP σ−1f NEf , (7)
1 = P σ−1f Ef [1 + φ (N − 1)] + φε
−σP σ−1h Eh,
where φ ≡ τ1−σ ∈ (0, 1) is a measure of trade freeness. These free-entry conditions imply a
negative relationship between Ph and Pf : to keep sales unchanged, a fall in Foreign demand must
be compensated by a rise in Home demand. Moreover, since firms do not have to pay the transport
cost to sell in their domestic market, the Home market is relatively more important to Home firms
than it is to Foreign firms.
Solving (7) for Ph and Pf yields an expression for the two price indexes:
P σ−1h =
1− φ+Nφ−Nφεσ




Ef (1− φ) (1 +Nφ)
.
13Note that we have dropped the variety index z as goods are symmetric, and have multiplied export demand by
τ to account for the iceberg nature of trade costs.
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Strikingly, Ph is monotonically decreasing in ε and Pf is monotonically increasing in ε in the feasible
range. Thus, a depreciation of Home’s exchange rate (a rise of ε) leads to a reduction in the Home
price index and to an increase in the Foreign price index. The intuition for this result is as follows.
An increase in ε makes Home producers relatively more competitive. To restore free entry, demand
must fall for Home firms and rise for Foreign firms. Since Home firms are relatively more sensitive
to local demand, the adjustment can only happen through a reduction in Ph and an increase in
Pf .14
The fall in the local price index after a depreciation may sound paradoxical at first. After all,
an increase in ε makes imported varieties more expensive and this tends to increase the price index.
So, how can the adjustment take place? The answer, as we show formally next, is through a change
in the mass of Home and Foreign firms.
Mass of Firms. We now determine the equilibrium mass of Home and Foreign firms, nh and nf
respectively. Using (2) yields:
P σ−1h = [nh + φε
1−σNnf ]
−1, (9)
P σ−1f = [φε
σ−1nh + nf (1− φ+Nφ)]−1.
As (9) makes it clear, keeping the number of firms constant, an increase in ε raises Ph. However,













Note that nh is increasing in ε and nf decreasing: a depreciation, by increasing the profitability of
Home firms at the expense of Foreign firms, induces firm delocation from Foreign to Home, implying
that home consumers save the trade cost on the varieties whose production has moved from the
Foreign country. As demonstrated by equation (8), this second effect through entry dominates,
because an increase in ε lowers the price index in Home and rises it in Foreign. This result, that
a devaluation lowers the price index due to the change in the number of firms, is similar to the
production-delocation effect first noticed by Venables (1987) in the context of an iceberg import
14Notice also that Home firms are more sensitive to changes in the local price index the larger the size of the local
market Eh. Hence, for a given depreciation, the fall in the local price index will be smaller in a large country.
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tariff.15
Trade Imbalances. The local-currency value of Home’s exports (gross of trade costs) equals
Xh = phτxhNnh. Thus, using (6),
Xh = NEf ε
σφP σ−1f nh.
Similarly, the gross exports of the N Foreign countries to Home are:
Xf = NEhε
−σφP σ−1h nf .
Hence, the local-currency value of Home’s trade surplus, Th = Xh − εXf , equals:
Th = φN(Ef ε
σP σ−1f nh − Ehε
1−σP σ−1h nf ). (11)










Importantly, equation (12) dictates the general equilibrium relationship between Th and ε. Simple
inspection reveals that Th is increasing in ε: hence, a trade surplus leads to a depreciation of the
exchange rate in this baseline model.
Notice that, imposing Th = 0, equation (12) pins down the exchange rate ε, and thus the terms
of trade, consistent with balanced trade. It is easy to show that, if countries are symmetric, then
Th = 0 implies ε = 1. In the presence of asymmetries, instead, the relative wage and the terms of
trade will tend to be higher in the country with a larger domestic market (high Li). The latter
result is a consequence of the familiar “home market effect”.
We summarize the main comparative statics to a change in Th in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 A transfer Th from Home to Foreign leads to: a) a depreciation of the exchange
rate ε (a reduction in Home’s relative wage and a terms-of-trade deterioration), b) an increase in
15For a constant number of firms, the result that a devaluation lowers the domestic price index would not hold.
Nevertheless, a devaluation can have a beneficial effect through a different channel: without entry, the higher compet-
itiveness of firms in the devaluing country would translate into positive profits. This profit-shifting effect is studied,
for example, in Ossa (2012). We explore the quantitative importance of entry in Section 4.4.
14

































3.2 The Transfer Problem Revisited
We are now in the position to discuss the welfare effects of a transfer Th from Home to Foreign.
Home transfers tradable varieties for a value Th to Foreign. Given quasi-linear preferences, at
constant prices this additional income would be absorbed entirely by an increase in consumption
of the Foreign nontraded good, which requires a reallocation of Foreign labor away from the traded
sectors. Similarly, the fall in Home income would be absorbed by lowering consumption of the
nontraded good, which requires a reallocation of Home labor to the traded sector. Given that firm
size is fixed, nh rises and nf falls. In the absence of trade costs, this substitution of firms would not
affect prices, and this would be the end of the story. However, in the presence of trade costs, the
relocation of production reduces the price index in the Home country, where there are now more
active firms, and raises it in the Foreign country, where fewer firms are left. In turn, the fall in
Ph and the rise in Pf lower the demand for Home goods and raise the demand for Foreign goods.
To restore the equilibrium, the Home wage must fall relative to Foreign, which corresponds to a
depreciation of the exchange rate (higher ε). The effect of a small transfer on the total number
of varieties is in general ambiguous as it depends on the nature of country asymmetries. If the
countries are symmetric, however, the fall in Ph is exactly compensated by the rise in Pf and the
total number of firms does not change.
Notice that, similarly to standard models, the transfer leads to a terms-of-trade deterioration
for the sending country. However, contrary to those models, the variety effect implies that this
terms-of-trade deterioration is, in itself, welfare improving for the sending countries. Thus, what
has been so far considered a “double burden”can actually alleviate the welfare cost of a transfer.
More formally, recall that Home welfare is given by:
Vh = Yh − 1− Th/Lh − lnPh.
15








where Ph,0 and Ph,T are the Home price indexes with Th = 0 and Th > 0, respectively. The first
term is the direct cost of the transfer, the second is the effect due to the change in the price index.










Let ∆Ṽh = −Th/Lh be the hypothetical welfare cost of the transfer at constant prices. Hence, the












We will use TR as a metric to assess by how much the price index effect can lower the real cost of
a given transfer. In particular, notice that TR = 1 if ε0 = εT , that is, when relative wages do not
move. As long as εT > ε0, the depreciation in Home is associated with a lower price index, which
reduces the real cost of the transfer by the factor TR < 1.
Can the price index effect be so large as to make the transfer welfare improving for the surplus
country? In other words, can TR turn negative? The striking answer is yes, as stated formally
below:
















2σ + φ− 1 > 1.
In the special case of N = 1 (two countries) and no asymmetries between Home and Foreign, the
determinants of the beneficial price-index effect can be easily characterized analytically: a transfer
is more likely to be welfare increasing for low values of σ and high trade costs, τ . For standard
parameter values the net welfare effect is negative. As we show in the next section through numerical
simulations, however, the positive price-index effect can be significant.
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So far, we have seen that a trade surplus leads to a fall in prices which increases the purchasing
power in Home. Besides being derived from conventional assumptions, this result is also realistic.
For instance, the fact that Chinese consumers benefited from the relocation of industrial production
to their home country is hard to dispute. Yet, this is probably the less important part of the story.
As we show in the next section, in the presence of traded intermediates, agglomeration of industrial
production is not just beneficial for consumers, it also improves the competitiveness of Chinese
firms.
4 Imbalances with Intermediate Goods
Intermediate goods play a prominent role in international trade. As already noted by Ethier (1982)
more than thirty years ago, “I cannot resist the temptation to point out that producers’ goods
are in fact much more prominent in trade than are consumers’goods”. Recent estimates confirm
his insight: by now, intermediate products account for about two-thirds of the volume of world
trade. In the rest of the paper we therefore consider a more general setup in which differentiated
intermediate goods are used in the production of final goods.
4.1 The Model with Intermediates
To model intermediate goods, we follow Krugman and Venables (1995). Specifically, we assume











where wi = 1 is the wage and Pi is the price index of manufacturing goods. This formulation
implies that manufacturing goods enter the production function for other manufacturing goods (as
intermediates) and the utility function (as final goods) through the same CES aggregator. The






= Pµi , (14)
where the latter equality follows from our normalization.
This formulation gives rise to agglomeration economies through the cost linkages between pro-
ducers of intermediates and final goods. This is because agglomeration allows local producers
of final goods to save on the trade costs of intermediate inputs, which reduces Pi and therefore
increases, ceteris paribus, the revenue and profits of manufacturing firms.
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Eq. (13) also implies that in each country the total expenditure on intermediate goods is a
constant share µ of the value of local manufacturing production. As a consequence, country i’s
total expenditure on manufacturing goods is now endogenous and is given by:
Ei = Li + µpini. (15)
Eq. (15) gives rise to agglomeration economies through the demand linkages between producers of
intermediates and final goods. This is because agglomeration leads to an increase in firms’sales of
intermediate inputs and therefore increases, ceteris paribus, their revenue and profits.
As in the previous section, using (14) in (6) and (4) we can solve for the price indexes:
P σ−1h =
pσh (1− φ+Nφ)−Nφεσpσf




Ef (1− φ) (1 +Nφ)
.
























Finally, the local-currency value of Home’s trade surplus equals Th = Xh − εXf , where Xh =













Using (14) in (15), (16), (17), and (18) yields a system of 5 equations in Ph, Pf , Eh, Ef and ε.
4.2 Transfer and Prices: Analytic Results
The above system is highly non linear and does not admit in general analytic solutions. Hence,
to gain insight on the model’s mechanics, we begin by considering a simplified symmetric two-
country version of the model in which we study the comparative-statics effects of a small transfer
in neighborhood of the symmetric, zero transfer, equilibrium. The analysis is greatly simplified
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because the symmetric equilibrium (with Ti = 0) is easy to characterize. Linearizing the system
we can prove (see the Appendix) the following results:
Proposition 3 Assume that σ (1− µ) > 1 and N = Lh = Lf = 1. Then, in a neighborhood of




The effect of the transfer on the exchange rate (Home’s relative wage) is instead ambiguous:
d ln ε
dTh
< 0 iff τσ−1 <
(1 + µ) (σ + σµ− 1)
(1− µ) (σ − σµ− 1) .
Thus, as in the baseline model, a trade surplus leads to a reduction in the price index in the
relevant range (i.e., for σ (1− µ) > 1).16 However, unlike in the baseline model, the sign of dε/dTh
is now in general ambiguous. In particular, dε/dTh turns negative when agglomeration forces are
strong enough, namely, when µ is suffi ciently large, or σ and τ are suffi ciently low. The intuition
for this surprising result is simple: by inducing the expansion in the traded sector, a trade surplus
strengthens agglomeration forces, and when these are strong enough, they are the key determinant
of a country’s competitiveness. It follows that the push to competitiveness given by agglomeration
forces may require an offsetting appreciation, rather than a depreciation, of the exchange rate.
4.3 Simulations
We now turn to numerical examples. To start with, we show the effects of non-infinitesimal transfers
in the symmetric case. Panel a) of Figure 3 plots Vh,T−Vh,0, where Vh,0 is Home welfare in Th = 0, as
a function of Th for different values of µ, the key parameter regulating the strength of agglomeration
forces in our model.17 In all cases we set σ = 3 and τ = 2.7. Note that, for µ = 0, we are back
in the baseline setup and welfare is monotonically decreasing in the trade surplus relative to the
balanced-trade equilibrium. For µ = 0.3 and µ = 0.4 the qualitative results are unchanged, but the
curve is less steep, the more so the higher is µ. Finally, for µ = 0.5 the results are reversed: welfare
is now an inverted-U function of Th. In other words, when agglomeration forces are strong enough,
16This is the so-called no-black-hole condition (see, e.g., Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999, p. 58). It is equivalent
to assuming that agglomeration forces are not too strong. Note also that, in the presence of intermediate goods,
the monopolistic distortion is captured by the term [σ (1− µ)− 1]−1, and that the latter becomes negative when the
no-black-hole condition is violated, a case arguably diffi cult to interpret. This provides a further justification for the
standard assumption that σ(1− µ) > 1.








































c) Terms of Trade
Transfer
µ = 0.4 
µ = 0.3 
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Figure 3: Imbalances, Welfare and Prices. Home welfare (panel a), exchange rate (panel b) and
Home’s terms of trade (panel c) as a function of Th, starting from the symmetric equilibrium.
a small transfer is welfare improving and there is an interior level of Th that maximizes Home utility.
This non-monotonicity of welfare with respect to the transfer is due to the endogenous response of
the exchange rate to Th: as shown in panel b), when agglomeration forces are strong, an increase
in the transfer leads to a large appreciation of the exchange rate for high Th; in turn, a fall of ε
leads, ceteris paribus, to an increase in the price index that adversely affects welfare.
Finally, Panel c) plots the terms of trade, i.e., the common-currency price of imported relative
to exported goods, which are now equal to εpf/ph = ε (Pf/Ph)
µ. Note that, for µ = 0.5, a trade
surplus leads to a terms-of-trade improvement. Thus, when agglomeration forces are strong enough,
a trade surplus may involve a terms-of-trade appreciation and a welfare increase: the implications
of the standard trade theory are now completely reversed!
After having understood the qualitative properties and the range of admissible outcomes, we
now simulate the model under two scenarios that account for more realistic asymmetries across
countries. In the first scenario, we consider a surplus country (Home) with the economic size of
China trading with two countries (Foreign) that capture broadly the United States and Europe.
We normalize the labor force of China to one, Lh = 1, and set Lf = 0.5, so as to match the
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observation that the non-rural labor force in China is roughly equal to the combined labor force of
the United States and Europe. We then set Yh = 3.3, roughly consistent with the observation that
the manufacturing share of GDP in China is 0.31 (World Bank). We also set Yf = 2 ∗ Yh so that
China, Europe and the United States have approximately the same aggregate economic size. With
these parameters, we study the effect of a transfer from Home equal to 2% of its GDP.
In the second scenario, we consider a surplus country (Home) with the economic size of Germany
trading with twenty-seven countries (Foreign) that capture the other EU member states. We
normalize the labor force of Germany to one, Lh = 1, and set Lf = 0.2 so as to match the fact
that Germany accounts for about 16% of the combined EU population. We then set Yh = 6 to
obtain a manufacturing share of 0.16, consistent with the EU average, and Yf = 4.5. The latter
figure matches the observation that GDP per capita in the average EU country is about 75% of the
German level. In the case of Germany, we study the effect of a transfer from Home equal to 4% of
its GDP.
Regarding the remaining parameters, we experiment with various combinations. To assess the
role of intermediate inputs, we consider the version of the model with no intermediates, µ = 0,
and the more realistic case in which their cost share is µ = 0.51, which is consistent with the U.S.
input-output table.18 As for the elasticity of substitution between product varieties, we consider
two values: σ = 3, which is close to the "macro" estimates often used in studies on current account
adjustments, and σ = 5, which is closer to the "micro" estimates often used in the trade literature.
Finally, we use two values also for the iceberg trade cost: τ = 2.7, consistent with Anderson and van
Wincoop’s (2004) tax-equivalent estimate of overall trade costs of 170% for industrialized countries;
and a more moderate level τ = 1.7, as in Melitz and Redding (2015). For each configuration of
parameters, we will compute the value of export as a share of GDP in the surplus country. This
will help us to gauge which combination of σ and τ yields more realistic volumes of trade, and also
how the price-index effect depends on the export share.
The main effects of the transfer in the first scenario are reported in Table 3. It shows: the
real cost of one unit of the transfer, TR; the percentage change in the exchange rate, ∆%ε; the
percentage change in the number of Home and Foreign manufacturing firms, ∆%nh and ∆%nf ,
respectively; and the value of export as a percentage of GDP in Home in the equilibrium with the
transfer. Recall that TR = 1 in the absence of price effects, and that an increase in ε (a depreciation
of Home’s exchange rate) also corresponds to a reduction in Home’s relative wage. In all cases,
18This figure is the ratio of manufacturing intermediates to value added plus intermediates, from Yamano and
Ahmad (2006). Manufacturing intermediates are not used in the nontraded sector, consistently with the observation
that services use intermediate inputs much less intensively. We relax this assumption in the next section.
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µ = 0 µ = 0.51
σ = 5 σ = 3 σ = 5 σ = 3
τ = 1.7 τ = 2.7 τ = 1.7 τ = 2.7 τ = 1.7 τ = 2.7 τ = 1.7 τ = 2.7
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TR 0.876 0.816 0.836 0.748 0.585 0.446 0.434 −0.045
∆%ε 3.28 23.19 1.01 4.96 −2.53 8.92 −5.84 −11.24
∆%nh 6.66 6.66 6.66 6.66 8.18 8.69 8.73 10.51
∆%nf −6.87 −5.83 −7.09 −7.08 −10.69 −10.43 −13.02 −21.32
Xh/Yh 5.18 2.29 9.65 5.57 8.25 2.70 15.28 7.11
Note: transfer equal to 2% of Yh, Lh = 1, Lf = 0.5, N = 2, Yh = 3.3, Yf = 6.6.
Table 3: Numerical Simulations, China
the fall in the Home price index has significant favorable effects on Home welfare, although the
magnitude varies notably across the parameter space. The price effect is weakest in column (1),
corresponding to no intermediates, low trade costs and high elasticity. Yet, even in this case, the
price effect lowers the cost of the transfer to 87% of its value. Either a lower value of σ or higher
trade costs can cut the cost to almost 80% (columns 2 and 3) and to 75% if both holds (column 4).
The effects are much larger in the presence of intermediate inputs. The price effect is now likely
to reduce by about half the cost of the transfer (columns 5, 6 and 7). In the most extreme case
(column 8), corresponding nonetheless to parameter values used in the literature, the transfer is
actually welfare improving for the sending country!
Looking at the impact on the exchange rate, Table 3 shows significant heterogeneity across
specifications. Without intermediate goods, the transfer leads to a fall in the Home relative wage
by between 1% and 23% (columns 1-4). However, if we exclude the case σ = 5, τ = 2.7, which
is probably not the most realistic combination as it implies a very low volume of trade, the wage
adjustment is of a few percentage points. With intermediate goods, instead, the transfer typically
leads to a rise in the Home relative wage (again, excluding the case σ = 5, τ = 2.7). The
appreciation ranges from 2.5% to 11%. In all cases, the transfer triggers a large relocation of
firms from Foreign to Home, of an order of magnitude around 6% − 13% of existing firms. The
relocation effect is especially strong in the presence of intermediate goods. Finally, except for the
case σ = 5, τ = 2.7, the model generates export volumes that are in the ballpark of the observed
data, especially in the presence of intermediate goods. For comparison, the volume of exports from
China to the United States and Europe reached a peak of around 12% of GDP in 2007, and fell
below 8% in 2015. Hence, a sizable price effect is compatible with realistic levels of home bias in
consumption.
The effect of the transfer in the second scenario is reported in Table 4. Compared to the previous
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µ = 0 µ = 0.51
σ = 5 σ = 3 σ = 5 σ = 3
τ = 1.7 τ = 2.7 τ = 1.7 τ = 2.7 τ = 1.7 τ = 2.7 τ = 1.7 τ = 2.7
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TR 0.919 0.858 0.917 0.840 0.729 0.543 0.721 0.351
∆%ε 1.33 10.67 0.36 2.00 −4.64 −2.51 −5.26 −12.61
∆%nh 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 28.18 31.13 28.31 34.25
∆%nf −4.76 −4.66 −4.70 −4.97 −7.35 −10.57 −7.01 −13.29
Xh/Yh 10.58 5.44 14.27 10.92 17.68 6.77 25.74 15.71
Note: transfer equal to 4% of Yh, Lh = 1, Lf = 0.2, N = 27, Yh = 6, Yf = 4.5.
Table 4: Numerical Simulations, Germany
case, all price effects are now smaller. This is because Germany is smaller than China, and hence a
given surplus (as a share of GDP) involves smaller general equilibrium effects. Yet, given the lower
manufacturing share in this scenario, the change in the number of Home firms is now larger and,
as a result, the price index effect can still lower significantly the cost of the transfer, to 92%− 35%
of its value. The last row confirms that, excluding the extreme case σ = 5, τ = 2.7, the model with
intermediate goods generates realistic values for the export share from Germany to the remaining
27 EU partners, which varies in the data within the range of 18%− 22% of GDP.
4.4 Robustness
So far, we have deliberately relied on a number of simplifying assumptions in order to put our
results in sharper relief and make our analysis more transparent. We are now in the position to
discuss how relaxing some of these assumptions affects the main results.
Preferences and Technology. We have assumed that preferences are non homothetic and quasi
linear, in this following a large theoretical literature on trade policy. Quasi-linear preferences are
analytically convenient but somewhat restrictive, as they imply no income effects in the demand
for manufacturing goods, and a constant marginal utility from consumption of the nontraded good.
We now assume, instead, that preferences are homothetic and Cobb Douglas.19 This tends to
weaken our results for two main reasons. First, they imply a decreasing (rather than a constant)
marginal utility from consumption of the nontraded good, and therefore an increasing opportunity
cost of expanding the manufacturing sector after a trade surplus. Second, with Cobb-Douglas
preferences a trade surplus implies, ceteris paribus, a fall of (rather than a constant) expenditure on
19Although commonly used, Cobb-Douglas preferences are not necessarily more realistic as they counterfactually
imply constant expenditure shares across countries.
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manufacturing goods, and therefore a smaller size of the domestic market and weaker agglomeration
forces. In this section we therefore want to quantify by how much our results are weakened under
reasonable parameter configurations when preferences are Cobb Douglas rather than quasi linear.
Moreover, so far we have assumed that manufacturing intermediate goods are used only in the
production of manufacturing goods. Although this is a reasonable approximation, allowing for
traded manufacturing inputs in the production function for the nontraded good should weaken our
results, as this reduces the asymmetry between the traded and nontraded sector. The question that
the we would like to address now is by how much. To this end, in this section we assume that the








where wi = 1 is the wage, Pi the price index of manufacturing goods, and µs is the cost and revenue
share of manufacturing intermediates in the nontraded sector.20 The production function for good
S assumed so far is therefore a special case of this more general formulation for µs = 0.
Formally, with Cobb-Douglas preferences the utility function in (1) is replaced by:
Ui = (1− α) ln
Ci(S)












where α ∈ (0, 1) now represents the exogenous consumption expenditure share of manufacturing
goods. Maximization of (19) yields:
Ci(M) =
α (Yi − Ti/Li)
Pi
, Ci(S) =
(1− α) (Yi − Ti/Li)
Pi(S)
, (20)
where, as before, Yi − Ti/Li is the expenditure per capita in country i (with Th > 0 and Tf =
−Th/ (Nε) < 0), and Yi is the labor effi ciency of one worker. Using (20) in (19), and noting that
lnPi(S) = µs lnPi, yields a new expression for Home’s indirect utility function:
Vh = ln (Yh − Th/Lh)− [α+ µs (1− α)] lnPh. (21)
Note also that expenditure on traded goods Ei now comes from the Cobb-Douglas final demand
in (20), and from the intermediate demand by the two sectors, i.e., µpini + µsPi(S)Ci(S). Thus,
20Note that this formulation implies that now manufacturing goods enter the production function for traded and
nontraded goods and the utility function through the same CES aggregator.
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α = 0.31 α = 0.12
σ = 5 σ = 3 σ = 5 σ = 3
τ = 1.7 τ = 2.7 τ = 1.7 τ = 2.7 τ = 1.7 τ = 2.7 τ = 1.7 τ = 2.7
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TR 0.770 0.689 0.677 0.391 0.679 0.561 0.560 0.164
∆%ε −0.31 6.11 −1.47 −1.97 −1.89 10.05 −4.70 −7.12
∆%nh 4.52 4.77 4.81 5.71 12.44 13.27 13.29 16.14
∆%nf −2.24 −2.15 −2.41 −2.83 −6.16 −5.59 −6.80 −8.16
Xh/Yh 14.69 3.82 29.82 16.12 7.59 2.63 14.74 8.14
Note: Th =2% of GDP, Lh = 1, Lf = 0.5, N = 2, Yh = 3.3, Yf = 6.6, µ = 0.51, µs = 0.05.
Table 5: Robustness, Cobb-Douglas Preferences and Intermediates in Services
equations (15) are now replaced by the following expressions:
Eh = [α+ µs (1− α)] (YhLh − Th) + µphnh, (22)
Ef = [α+ µs (1− α)] (YfLf + Ti/ (Nε)) + µpfnf .
The rest of the model is unchanged. Thus, using (22) and (14) in (16), (17), and (18) yields a
system of 5 equations in Ph, Pf , Eh, Ef and ε that can be easily solved numerically.

















is the hypothetical welfare change at constant prices. Thus, the real cost of the transfer relative to










We now simulate the extended model using the same baseline parameters values as in the previ-
ous section. To save space, however, we only focus on the scenario corresponding to China trading
with the United States and Europe. Regarding the cost share of manufacturing intermediates in
the nontraded sector, we set µs = 0.05, consistent with the U.S. input-output tables.
21 As for the
21Results are not very sensitive to this parameter.
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share of manufacturing goods in consumption expenditure, using the manufacturing share of GDP
as a proxy we obtain an α equal to 0.12 in the United States and 0.31 in China. We therefore
simulate the model in both cases α = 0.12 and α = 0.31 to have a sense of how the results change
when considering the plausible range of values for this parameter. The results are reported in Table
5.
Comparing the new simulations in Table 5 to those in Table 3, we see that the beneficial price
index effect is now weaker but still significant, with TR ranging from 0.77 to 0.16. The average
across simulations implies that the price effect can lower the real cost of the transfer to 56% of its
value. Moreover, we confirm the previous finding that, excluding the case σ = 5 and τ = 2.7, the
transfer leads to a rise in the Home relative wage, and the appreciation is of the same order of
magnitude as before. Finally, in all cases, the transfer still triggers a large relocation of firms from
Foreign to Home and the size of the phenomenon is similar to the previous simulations.
Endogenous Labor Supply. Another interesting question, explored for example in Corsetti,
Martin and Pesenti (2013), is how the income transfer and the implied changes in relative prices
affect the supply of labor, and what are its welfare consequences. To isolate the firm relocation
effect, in our benchmark case we assumed labor effort to be fixed. However, it is not diffi cult to
relax this assumption. Doing so will show that the transfer induces agents to work more in the
surplus country and less in the receiving country, thereby amplifying the production relocation
effect.
Following Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2013), we generalize preferences by adding disutility
from labor:
Ui = (1− α) ln
Ci(S)






where li is the supply of labor of the representative agent and ξ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity.
Substituting Ci(M) and Ci(S) from (20) after taking into account that labor income is now Yili
yields:








The first-order condition for labor effort, li, is:
Yi
Yili − Ti/Li
= lξi . (23)
Clearly, li increases with the transfer. The intuition is that the transfer lowers income and hence
raises the marginal utility from consumption, which increases the value of working. Note also
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α = 0.31 α = 0.12
σ = 5 σ = 3 σ = 5 σ = 3
τ = 1.7 τ = 2.7 τ = 1.7 τ = 2.7 τ = 1.7 τ = 2.7 τ = 1.7 τ = 2.7
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TR 0.680 0.578 0.556 0.164 0.638 0.509 0.504 0.059
∆%ε −0.88 5.38 −2.22 −3.36 −2.45 9.32 −5.44 −8.47
∆%nh 5.81 6.14 6.20 7.45 13.75 14.67 14.70 17.94
∆%nf −2.89 −2.79 −3.13 −3.73 −6.84 −6.23 −7.57 −9.17
Xh/Yhlh 14.54 3.78 29.52 15.90 7.52 2.60 14.58 8.03
Note: ξ = 1; all other parameters as in Table 5.
Table 6: Robustness, Endogenous Labor Supply
that, without the transfer, (23) yields li = 1, as before. Moreover, the extended model nests the
benchmark case with exogenous labor supply, which corresponds to the limit ξ →∞.
Home’s indirect utility function generalizes to:




Expenditures on traded goods are still given by (22) after replacing total labor income with YiliLi.
Following the same steps as before, define ∆Vh the change in Home welfare after a transfer Th and
∆Ṽh the hypothetical welfare change at constant prices. Then, the real cost of the transfer relative















With these new expressions, we now replicate the simulations in Table 6. Following Gali’,
Gertler and López-Salido (2007) and the benchmark case in Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2013),
we set ξ = 1, which implies that the transfer increases labor supply in the Home country by 1%.
The results are shown in Table 6. Comparing ∆%nh and ∆%nf in Table 6 and in Table 3 we see
that, given the increase in the hours worked in the surplus country and its contraction in deficit
countries, the relocation of firms from Foreign to Home is now larger. The reduction in the Home
price index due to the increase in employment more than compensate the higher disutility from
labor, or else agents would not have chosen to work more hours. Hence, the real cost of the transfer
is lower than in the case with exogenous labor supply.
Intensive Margin and Variable Markups. In the model studied so far firm size is fixed, so
that the adjustment in production can only occur through a change in the number of operating
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firms, i.e., along the extensive margin. Given the importance of the number of firms for welfare, we
would like to know how much our quantitative results could change if firms can also adjust their
scale, i.e., when the intensive margin is also active. Recall that firm size is pinned down by the
free entry condition, q = f(σ − 1)θ. As it is well known, q is constant if markups do not vary.
However, firm size will adjust endogenously in the presence of pro-competitive effects. A simple
way of allowing for this possibility, inspired to Krugman (1979), is to postulate that the demand
elasticity perceived by a firm, σi, is a function of the number of local competitors:
σi = σ(ni + 1)
ς ,
where the new parameter ς regulates the strength of the pro-competitive effect. The benchmark
model corresponds to ς = 0. The equilibrium quantity and price of a variety are:






With this formulation, an increase in the number of firms in a given location raises the competitive
pressure and induces firms to lower their markup and expand their size. Hence, total production
adjusts both along the intensive and the extensive margin. While the literature has proposed many
micro-foundations for this effect, we captures it in a simple and flexible way.
We now replicate the simulation in Table 6 assuming ς = 1, which under our parametrization
implies that the extensive margin is roughly twice as reactive than the intensive margin. This is
consistent with the finding in Hummels and Klenow (2005) that the extensive margin accounts for
two-thirds of the greater exports of larger economies. On the other hand, it also implies a rather
strong change in markups. The results are shown in Table 7, which also reports the change in firm
size in Home (∆%qh). Compared to Table 6, firm relocations and hence the price effect are weaker.
Nevertheless, even in this case the real cost of the transfer is reduced significantly, to 85% − 49%
of its value.
5 Imbalances and Agglomeration
So far we have treated the transfer Th as exogenous and the exchange rate ε as endogenous. That
is, we have implicitly assumed that the transfer is determined outside the model, either by the
saving decision of agents as in the intertemporal approach to the current account (see e.g., Obstfeld
and Rogoff, 1995); or by the active intervention of a government, for example by imposing capital
controls and accumulating reserves (e.g., Benigno and Fornaro, 2012). We have then studied the
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α = 0.31 α = 0.12
σ = 5 σ = 3 σ = 5 σ = 3
τ = 1.7 τ = 2.7 τ = 1.7 τ = 2.7 τ = 1.7 τ = 2.7 τ = 1.7 τ = 2.7
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TR 0.863 0.777 0.848 0.681 0.788 0.675 0.725 0.487
∆%ε 1.48 11.13 1.17 2.24 1.45 15.72 0.45 0.71
∆%nh 3.15 3.33 3.10 3.46 8.16 8.72 8.28 9.57
∆%nf −0.76 −0.67 −0.77 −0.76 −1.41 −1.18 −1.29 −1.18
∆%qh 1.67 1.74 1.97 2.09 3.17 3.29 3.85 4.03
Xh/Yhlh 9.94 3.01 17.88 10.34 6.35 2.45 11.41 7.15
Note: ξ = 1 and ς = 1; all other parameters as in Table 5.
Table 7: Robustness, Intensive Margin and Variable Markups
implications of the transfer on prices, including the exchange rate, and welfare.
Although this is a scenario that has received significant attention in the literature, it is not
the only relevant case. Rather than choosing Th, a government could equally choose a value for ε,
and adjust actively the transfer in order to reach its target. For example, the Chinese government
might have been intervening in the international capital markets so as to avoid any deterioration
of the country’s competitiveness.
Since the general equilibrium relationship between Th and ε is dictated by a trade-imbalance
condition, one may expect that treating Th or ε as exogenous should not affect the results. This is
indeed the case in our baseline model without intermediate goods. Interestingly, however, this is
not necessarily true in the presence of intermediate goods, as the latter give rise to agglomeration
economies and the possibility of multiple equilibria (see, e.g., Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999).
As a consequence, fixing Th or fixing ε may make a difference for the results. This is because fixing
the size of the transfer is also equivalent to preventing agglomeration forces from fully deploying
the circular and cumulative causation processes that lead to agglomeration. In contrast, fixing the
exchange rate (or relative wages) can unleash agglomeration forces, because it prevents offsetting
relative price changes.
To make our point, we use the model with intermediate goods to compare two scenarios: in the
first the transfer is exogenously fixed at Th = 0; in the second, the exchange rate is exogenously
fixed at the balanced-trade level. Moreover, to obtain analytical results and simplify the comparison
with Krugman and Venables (1995) and Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999), we focus on two
symmetric countries. This implies that in both cases a symmetric equilibrium always exists. The
key question is therefore whether the symmetric equilibrium is also stable. The main result will be
to show that keeping relative wages fixed can turn the symmetric equilibrium unstable, leading to
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agglomeration of manufacturing in the country that starts to run a trade surplus.
To study the stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium, we closely follow Krugman and
Venables (1995) and Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999). Specifically, we denote by wi the
maximum wage (in local currency) that a manufacturing firm can pay and break even and we
study how it varies out of equilibrium as a function of manufacturing employment, denoted by λi.
Recall that, as in the previous section, the wage paid by the nontraded sector in each country is
the numeraire and ε is the exchange rate between the two numeraires. In equilibrium, wi = 1 in
both countries under our assumption that the nontraded good is always produced in both countries.
Yet, if we perturb the equilibrium by moving some firms from one country to the other, i.e., by
changing λi, then wi will change as well. Then, the relationship between wi and λi can be used
to study the stability of the symmetric equilibrium. If this relationship is negative, it means that
an expansion of the manufacturing sector requires firms to pay a wage below the wage paid by
the nontraded sector. That is, firms are losing profitability and hence the equilibrium is stable.
Conversely, a positive relationship between wi and λi implies that agglomeration (an increase in λi)
allows firms to pay higher wages and hence attract workers from the nontraded sector. In this case,
firm profitability increases with the size of the manufacturing sector and hence the equilibrium is
unstable.
Formally, (13) implies that the manufacturing wage bill is a constant share of revenue, i.e.,
wiλi = (1− µ)nipi. This allows us to express the mass of manufacturing firms and manufacturing










Next, recall that total expenditure on manufacturing goods equals Ei = 1 + µnipi, which can we
rewritten using (24) as
Ei = 1 +
µ
1− µwiλi. (25)
The remaining equilibrium conditions needed to track the relationship between wi and λi are, first,
the expression for the price index:










in which ni and pi have been substituted out; and, second, the market clearing condition for a firm:












Given ε and λi, these equations can be solved for Pi, Ei and wh.
We are now in the position to study the stability property of the equilibrium. As a preliminary
step, we verify that when Th = 0 and ε adjusts endogenously, as in the previous section, the (unique)
equilibrium is always stable. To show this, note that Home expenditure on traded goods is equal
to domestic sales plus imports:
Eh = nhphdh + εnfpfxfτ .
Since trade is balanced, the volume of imports is equal to the volume of export: εnfpfxf = nhphxh.
Hence,
Eh = nhphdh + nhphxhτ .
But this is equal to the revenue of the traded sector in Home (domestic sales plus export): Eh =







Finally, substituting (25) yields wh = wfλf/λh. If Foreign is in equilibrium, wf = 1, then the
relationship between λh and wh is negative. Hence:
Proposition 4 Assume that σ (1− µ) > 1 and N = Lh = Lf = 1. Then, under Th = 0, the




Starting at the symmetric equilibrium, in which wh = wf = 1, a reallocation of manufacturing
workers from Foreign to Home reduces the Home manufacturing wage below the wage paid by the
nontraded sector, thereby implying that the symmetric equilibrium is globally stable. Thus, unlike
in the standard new economic geography literature in our model agglomeration is impossible when
Th is fixed. The intuition for this result is simple: independent of how strong agglomeration forces
are, any incipient competitive advantage induced by the operation of agglomeration forces is offset
by an appreciation of the exchange rate.
Suppose now that the exchange rate is fixed at ε = 1, i.e., at the symmetric equilibrium, and
that the trade surplus Th adjusts according to (18). In this case, we obtain a system of equations
almost identical to that studied in Krugman and Venables (1995).22 As in that paper, by linearizing
the system of equations in the symmetric equilibrium we can obtain an analytical expression for
dwh/dλh. This yields the following Proposition (proof in the Appendix):
22The only marginal difference is quasi-linear instead of Cobb-Douglas utility.
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Proposition 5 Assume that σ (1− µ) > 1 and N = Lh = Lf = 1. Assume also that ε = 1. Then,
in a neighborhood of Ti = 0,
dwh
dλh
> 0 iff τσ−1 <
(1 + µ) (σ + σµ− 1)
(1− µ) (σ − σµ− 1) .
The condition in Proposition 5, which is identical to the one found in Krugman and Venables
(1995), shows that the symmetric equilibrium can become unstable if µ is high and σ and τ low.
When the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable, manufacturing firms start to agglomerate in
one country and that country runs a trade surplus. Interestingly, the condition in Proposition 5 is
the same as the condition needed for the transfer to trigger an appreciation in Home, an outcome
that is not unlikely in our previous simulations.23
Our analysis suggests a possible reinterpretation of some results in the new economic geography
literature. According to the latter, agglomeration is triggered by a change in the structural para-
meters, such as a reduction in trade costs or an increase in the importance of intermediate goods
in manufacturing production. Yet, as we have shown, agglomeration is impossible under balanced
trade whenever wages adjust. Our model suggests instead that trade imbalances might be the key:
if agglomeration forces are strong enough, a country can become the “world factory” if able and
willing to make a large transfer to its trading partners.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the welfare effects of trade imbalances, treated as an income transfer,
in the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model of monopolistic competition. This model is the workhorse
of trade economists, and most recent developments in trade theory build on it. It is therefore
surprising that trade imbalances have received little attention in this setup. The main goal of this
paper was to fill this gap, and in doing so we found new results that stand in sharp contrast with
the conventional wisdom.
We have shown that trade imbalances have a large impact on the international location of man-
ufacturing firms. A transfer increases the demand for nontraded goods for the recipient and lowers
it for the donor. Hence, manufacturing firms move from the deficit to the surplus country. In the
presence of trade costs, the relocation of production reduces the price index for the donor and raises
it for the recipient. This price index effect is beneficial for consumers in the surplus country and,
23This is not by accident. When ε is exogenous, agglomeration forces make the symmetric equilibrium unstable,
as in Krugman and Venables (1995). When T is exogenous, instead, the symmetric equilibrium is always stable, and
agglomeration forces show up in an appreciation of the exchange rate.
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in the presence of intermediate goods, it also increases the competitiveness of manufacturing firms.
If wages do not adjust, this mechanism generates a force towards agglomeration of manufacturing
in the surplus country.
Realistic calibrations suggest that the price index effect can lower significantly the cost of the
transfer. The exact magnitude of the effect depends crucially on parameters that are diffi cult to
measure empirically, like the elasticity of substitution between varieties and trade costs. In all
the cases, however, we find that a surplus is associated with a sharp increase in the size of the
manufacturing sector.
Although derived in a relatively stylized model, these results can help explain several puzzling
observations. For instance, the price-index effect can help rationalize why policy makers are often
so worried about the decline in manufacturing employment. Our model is also consistent with
the observation that developing countries experiencing a productivity take-off in their tradable
sectors tend to accumulate foreign assets, i.e., the so called “allocation puzzle” (Gourinchas and
Jeanne, 2013). However, it would point to causality running from foreign asset accumulation to
productivity growth.24 A careful empirical investigation of these mechanisms is still missing and
seems an important challenge for future research in international finance and trade.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Note first that, when N = Lh = Lf = 1, the model in Section 3 boils down to the following
equations:
24Benigno and Fornaro (2012) put forward a similar hypothesis assuming a knowledge externality in the tradeable
sector. Also, Rodrik (2008) finds that real exchange rate depreciations stimulate growth in developing countries and
that this effect is increasing in the size of the tradeable sector. Our model provides a microfoundation for these
effects.
33






















































To study the comparative-statics effects of a small transfer and prove the results in Proposition
3, we linearize the above system in the neighborhood of the symmetric balanced-trade point, i.e.,
we totally differentiate (28)-(32) with respect to Th in Th = 0. We define ŷ ≡ y′/y, where y′ ≡
dy/dTh|Th=0 is the total derivative of a variable in Th = 0. Moreover, we exploit country symmetry,
which implies that ŷf = −ŷh.
In the symmetric balanced-trade equilibrium: ε = 1, nh = nf = n, Eh = Ef = E and
Ph = Pf = P . Using these in (28)-(30) we obtain:







Totally differentiating (28) and using (33) yields:
Êh = µ
2P̂h + µn̂h. (34)
Totally differentiating (29), using (33) and P̂f = −P̂h, yields:





1− φ − Êh
⇒ P̂h = −
φσε̂+ (1− φ) Êh
(σ − 1) (1− φ)− µσ (1 + φ) . (35)


















Finally, totally differentiating (32), using (33) and again exploiting symmetry yields:(
2σ
1− φ − 1
)
ε̂ =




1− φP̂h − 2Êh. (37)



















φµ (2σ − 1 + φ) ε̂− 4φσµ2P̂h
(1− φ) [1− φ− µ (1 + φ)] . (38)




1− φ− µ (1 + φ)
2σ − 1 + φ +
4σµ
2σ − 1 + φP̂h,
P̂h = −
µ (1− φ) + σφε̂
(σ − 1) (1− φ)− µσ (1 + φ) .
Solving for P̂h and ε̂ we finally obtain:
P̂h = −
(1− φ) [σ + µ (σ − 1)]
2σ [σ (1− µ)− 1] + µσ (1 + φ)− (σ − 1) (1− φ) , (39)
ε̂ =
(1− φ)2 [φ (1 + µ) (σ + µσ − 1)− (1− µ) (σ − µσ − 1)]
φ {(2σ − 1 + φ) [(σ − 1) (1− φ)− µσ (1 + φ)] + 4φσ2µ} . (40)









σ < 0. Hence the sign of ε̂ switches from positive to negative in the relevant
range of µ. In particular, recalling that φ = τ1−σ, we have that
ε̂ < 0 iff µ >
(2σ − 1) (1 + φ)−
√
(1 + φ)2 + 16σφ (σ − 1)
2σ (1− φ) ⇔ τ
σ−1 <
(1 + µ) (σ + σµ− 1)
(1− µ) (σ − σµ− 1) . (41)
7.2 Proof of Proposition 5
To prove the results in Proposition 5, we totally differentiate equations (25)-(27) with respect to
Th in Th = 0 under the assumption that the exchange rate is exogenously fixed at ε = 1. Moreover,
as in the previous Appendix, we define ŷ ≡ y′/y, where y′ ≡ dy/dTh|Th=0 is the total derivative of
a variable in Th = 0, and we exploit country symmetry, which implies that ŷf = −ŷh.
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Recall that in the symmetric balanced-trade equilibrium:
λh = λf = wh = wf = 1, Eh = Ef =
1
1− µ. (42)
Thus, totally differentiating (25) and using (42) yields:
Êh = µ (ŵh + 1) . (43)
Totally differentiating (26) and using (42) yields:




1 + [1− σ(1− µ)] ŵh − σµP̂h
)
⇒ P̂h =
(1− φ) [σ(1− µ)− 1] ŵh − (1− φ)
(σ − 1) (1 + φ)− (1− φ)σµ . (44)
Totally differentiating (27) and using (42) yields:




(σ − 1) P̂h + Êh
]
⇒ ŵh =
[(1− φ) (σ − 1)− µσ (1 + φ)] P̂h + (1− φ) Êh
(1− µ) (1 + φ)σ .
Using (43) and (44) to eliminate Êh and P̂h from ŵh finally yields:
ŵh = −
φ (1 + µ) (σ + µσ − 1)− (1− µ) (σ − µσ − 1)
(1− φ)
{[
σ (1− µ) 1+φ1−φ − µ
] [
(σ − 1) 1+φ1−φ − µσ
]
− [σ(1− µ)− 1]
(
σ − 1− µσ 1+φ1−φ
)} .
Note that the denominator of ŵh is greater than zero for σ (1− µ) > 1. Moreover, the numerator
of ŵh is identical to the expression in square brackets on the numerator of ε̂ in (40), which implies
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